But the contradiction in Fukuyama's own analysis -- he says the Administration essentially believed two things at once (that America should change the world by force, and that democracy will always right the world on its o wn) -- leads him to get the Administration's actions wrong.I'm not sure this distinction can be oversold - the situation in Iraq is as much, if not more, a failure of action as it is a failure of ideas. But Fukuyama's disenchantment leaves him casting about for new ideas, while ignoring the need for a cogent plan of action. Sometimes you have to say it: it's the policy, stupid. And that's why, reluctantly most of the time, I consider myself a Realist.
This is because the Administration's failure to plan for the post-invasion Iraq had less to do with its ideas of democracy than with its failure to appreciate the idea and art of governance.
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
A Follow Up on Fukuyama
To continue from my previous post on F2, I thought I'd pass on, via an ObWi commenter, this response, which notes that Fukuyama is still stuck in a box of sorts: